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BLUE SKY STEROIDS
BY GEOFFREY RAPP*
Performance-enhancing substance use has attracted considerable
political and media attention. However, relatively little analysis of the
reasons for regulating substance use in professional sports exists. Most of
the ostensible reasons for regulating performance-enhancing substance use
are belied by leagues' inadequate commitment to the justifications in other
contexts. Further, most of the methods of proposed regulation would be
ineffective and unworkable. In place of the standard test-and-punish
regime advocated by doping authorities, this Essay argues that
performance-enhancing substance policy should be modeled after federal
and state securities regulation. Instead of punishing use, regulators should
require disclosure of all substances used, and punish only omissions and
fraud of a material nature. The goals of a regulation regime would be
better achieved without unintended negative consequences through a
market approach based on minimum disclosure requirements.
I. INTRODUCTION
It should come as no surprise that the nation's political establishment
in Washington, D.C., turned its attention to the scourge of performance-
enhancing substances in professional sports.' This allowed politicians on
Capitol Hill to take a break 2 from "interminable speeches"'3 to fawn over the
Associate Professor, University of Toledo College of Law. A.B., Harvard College;
J.D., Yale Law School.
1 Steroids use has been described as having reached "epidemic levels" in professional
sports. Jim Thurston, Chemical Warfare: Battling Steroids in Athletics, I MARQ. SPORTS
L.J. 93, 94 (1990).
2 See Scott B. Shapiro, Comment, Who Decides: Institutional Choice in Determining a
Performance Enhancing Drug Policy for the NFL, 7 Wyo. L. REV. 183, 185-87 (2007)
(discussing 2005 congressional hearings on the steroid issue).
3 BattlestarGalactica.com, Episode #111: Colonial Day, http://www.battlestar
galactica.com/modemdocs/jl-eps-guide0013.htm (last visited May 1, 2009) (providing a
synopsis of Battlestar Galactica: Colonial Day (SciFi Channel television broadcast Feb. 2,
2005)) ("Politics is the only thing more boring than blood samples. All those interminable
speeches, all that dreary pomp.").
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likes of Roger Clemens and Rafael Palmeiro, as well as those players'
(purportedly) artificially enhanced muscle mass. Even the President of the
United States-with the nation in the midst of two conflicts abroad and
teetering on the brink of economic disaster-thought the issue so pressing
that it merited several minutes of his annual State of the Union address in
2004.4
Something has to be done to stop these athletes, we are told.5
Baseball's supposed "antitrust exemption" is on the table: if Bud Selig
doesn't clean up the so-called national pastime, his league should be subject
to federal antitrust law.6 And criminal laws are coming!7 Players may go to
jail, where Super Bowl rings won't do them much good.
Amidst all the sound and fury,8 most policymakers pay only brief
attention to the threshold question of why steroids and other performance-
enhancing substances are a problem in professional sports. 9 Steroids are
bad, it is assumed, and so the only questions worth debating are how to ban
them and how to test for them. All the major professional sports leagues
4 See Nicholas W. Schieffelin, Note, Maintaining Educational and Athletic Integrity:
How Will Schools Combat Performance-Enhancing Drug Use?, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 959,
966 (2008) ("President Bush emphasized the escalating use of performance-enhancing drugs
in our society and made it an issue of national concern .... "); Adrian Wilairat, Comment,
Faster, Higher, Stronger? Federal Efforts to Criminalize Anabolic Steroids and Steroid
Precursors, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 377, 377 (2005).
5 See generally GEORGE J. MITCHELL, DLA PIPER LLP, REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER OF
BASEBALL OF AN INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION INTO THE ILLEGAL USE OF STEROIDS AND
OTHER PERFORMANCE ENHANCING SUBSTANCES BY PLAYERS IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
(2007), available at http://files.mlb.corn/mitchrpt.pdf (providing specific allegations of
performance-enhancing substance use and making nineteen separate recommendations for
change).
6 See Editorial, A Bad Call: Direct Investigation of Professional Sports Scandals by
Congress, YOUNG LAW. (Phila.), May 8, 2008, at 5; Darryl Slater, Power Tied to Privilege:
MLB's Antitrust Exemption Offers Congress Basis for Steroids Hearings, RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH, Dec. 18, 2007, at D2.
7 Wilairat, supra note 4, at 378.
8 According to Will Carroll, the "so-called debate over performance-enhancing drugs has
not been much of a debate at all. Most times it has been an emotional plea or political
grandstanding." WILL CARROLL, THE JUICE: THE REAL STORY OF BASEBALL'S DRUG
PROBLEMS 15 (2005).
9 My Essay discusses the issue only in connection with professional sports. Amateur
sports, college sports, and high school sports raise different issues in regards to performance-
enhancing substance use. In particular, the negative health consequences of performance-
enhancing substance use may be amplified in younger users. See Thurston, supra note 1, at
103. Young athletes may also lack the cognitive sophistication to appreciate fully the risks
and benefits of performance-enhancing substance use. See Schieffelin, supra note 4, at 978-
79. In addition, where testing is performed by state institutions such as public schools or
universities, constitutional concerns can impede effective testing and discipline. See
Thurston, supra note 1, at 112-14.
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have now put in place some type of drug-testing regime through the
collective bargaining process.I°
Five main arguments underlie policymakers' assumptions and
motivate their aggressive approaches to eradicating performance-enhancing
substances from professional sports. These arguments, which surface in the
literature and occasionally in policy discussions, are thought to justify
testing athletes for banned substances and punishing those who fail the
tests. First, performance-enhancing substances must be banned in order to
"level the playing field."'1 Second, performance-enhancing substances are
bad for player health.1 2 Third, performance-enhancing substance users are
poor role models for children who often idolize professional athletes. 3
Fourth, use of performance-enhancing substances could expose players to
influence by gamblers aimed at manipulating on-field competition to
produce ill-gotten gains. 14 Finally, fans do not like it when players use
performance-enhancing substances, and want a game clean from the taint of
steroids and other performance-enhancing substances. 5 However, these
rationales are either unconvincing, belied by the leagues' approach to
related issues, or they are in pursuit of goals not likely to be achieved by
any plausible "test-and-punish" regime.
In this Essay, I suggest a rethinking of the regulatory approach to
performance-enhancing substance use in professional sports. Rather than
test and punish through disciplinary sanctions and criminal law, aiming to
control the substance of players' substance use, I suggest that performance-
enhancing drugs be controlled through an approach modeled after federal
and state regulation of the financial aspects of corporate activity.
The federal government's securities laws-and state "Blue Sky" laws
designed in similar fashion-have traditionally shied away from imposing
substantive restrictions on corporate activity. Corporations are not told to
avoid particular kinds of risky investments, or to allocate assets in certain
ways.1 6 Instead, the federal and state securities laws call for everything to
be out in the open and visible, so that a shareholder can tell that a
10 David M. Wachutka, Comment, Collective Bargaining Agreements in Professional
Sports: The Proper Forum for Establishing Performance-Enhancing Drug Testing Policies,
8 PEPP. DiSP. RESOL. L.J. 147, 147 (2007).
" See infra Part II.A.
12 See infra Part II.B.
13 See infra Part II.C.
14 See infra Part ll.D.
"5 See infra Part II.E.
16 Cf UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 3, 7 U.L.A. 15 (2006). Unlike state business laws,
the Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA) takes a substantive approach to regulating the
investment of trust assets, mandating that they be diversified unless a trustee has a basis to
believe that special circumstances justify a non-diverse portfolio. Id.
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corporation is selling nothing more than the "Blue Sky." Securities laws
allow corporations to do whatever they want with shareholders' money, so
long as they disclose what they are doing with it. Substantive decisions are
not reviewed and punished when found to be wrong, except in rare
instances. Instead, it is the failure to disclose that leads to securities
liability.
The "Blue Sky" approach achieves a level of market stability when
substantive governmental intervention would be impossible or ineffective
due to limited resources and the complexity of modem business affairs.
Our securities regulation regime trusts that, in ordinary times, market forces
will discipline corporate managers who waste or misdirect business assets."
The disclosure approach minimizes monitoring costs and allows market
arbitrage to replace governmental intervention as the source of discipline
for corporate leaders.
A similar approach could do wonders in professional sports. Rather
than ban certain substances and test for them (or their masking agents),
sports leagues should simply call for all players to disclose all "non-food"
substances they put into their bodies. Penalties would exist not for using
drugs per se, but only for failing to disclose accurately those substances
used.
II. THE FLAWED CASE FOR A "TEST-AND-PUNISH" REGIME
A. "LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD"
The first argument in favor of an aggressive approach to regulating
professional athletes' use of steroids and other performance-enhancing
substances is also the most vague. This argument is framed in ethical
terms.18 Competition in professional sports "should be honorable," and the
use of performance-enhancing substances is "both cheating and a
contradiction to the meaning of sport.'' 19 Testing regimes-accompanied
17 Writing anything about financial market regulation is always a challenge during
extraordinary periods of market turmoil. While this Essay was in various stages of the
publication process, America's financial markets lost fully one-third of their value. Madlen
Read, Stocks Turn in Worst Effort for Obama: Dow Jones Down 32 Percent Since Election
Day, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 10, 2009, http://www.newschief.com/article/20090310/
NEWS/903105038. In extraordinary times such as these, markets may overreact,
undercutting their potential to allocate resources efficiently. See Thomas W. Joo, Who
Watches the Watchers? The Securities Investor Protection Act, Investor Confidence and the
Subsidization of Failure, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 1071, 1108 n.199 (1999).
18 Thurston, supra note 1, at 95-96.
19 Id. at 95.
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by disciplinary sanctions-are said to be justified because they will help
ensure that competition occurs on a level playing field.
One weakness of the ethical argument against performance-enhancing
substances is that it imagines that a level playing field can be achieved if
drugs are eradicated. This may be unrealistic. Legal performance-
enhancing techniques, like "weight machines, treadmills, better training
programs, better diets, better dieting techniques, computer diagnosed
training, [and] hyperbaric chambers . .. ,,20 not to mention innate genetic
differences in ability, will always produce an "unlevel" playing field in
which some athletes have an advantage over others. The challenge for one
seeking to justify a drug testing regime lies in "articulating a convincing
distinction between these enhancers and steroids.",
21
Even if they could be justified, testing regimes face a near-fatal
impediment to success: the difficulty of defining what is banned. Two
approaches to articulating the scope of any substance can be envisioned,
and both approaches have significant real-world limitations. First, and most
commonly, a testing regime can identify a list of "banned" substances.
22
Alternatively, a testing regime can provide a generic description of a
banned substance, for instance, as any substance not available over the
23
counter that gives an athlete an unfair advantage over competitors.
A testing regime based on a list of banned substances fails to stop
athletes from using new drugs that are not on the banned list.24 In responseto this problem, anti-doping authorities have expanded their list of banned
20 Colin Latiner, Steroids and Drug Enhancements in Sports: The Real Problem and the
Real Solution, 3 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 192,208 (2006).
21 Lewis Kurlantzick, Is There a Steroids Problem? The Problematic Character of the
Case for Regulation, 40 NEw ENG. L. REv. 789, 790 (2006).
22 See, e.g., WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, THE WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE: THE 2009
PROHIBITED LIST INTERNATIONAL STANDARD (2009), available at http://www.wada-
ama.org/rtecontent/document/2009_Prohibited List ENGFinal_20_Sept08.pdf, see also
Srikumaran Melethil, Making the WADA Prohibited List: Show Me the Data, 50 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 75 (2005) (discussing the WADA list).
23 One analyst proposed that a substance be banned if it "creates an unfair advantage" or
has "unhealthy/damaging side effects." Kirk Mango, Performance Enhancement: Where Do
We Draw the Line? Part II-The Guidelines, BLEACHER REPORT, Aug. 29, 2008,
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/52268-performance-enhancement-where-do-we-draw-the-
line-part-ii-the-guidelines. Although no evident real-world examples of a truly generic
approach exist, the drug policy of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) may
come close. The NCAA promulgates a specific list of banned drugs, but also prohibits any
substance belonging to the "banned drug class." NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC Ass'N,
2008-09 NCAA BANNED-DRUG LIST, http://www.ncaa.org/health-safety (follow "2008-09
NCAA Banned-Drug List" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 22, 2009). The "classes" described
are fairly generic-"stimulants" and "diuretics," for instance, could describe many common
beverages. Id.
24 Thurston, supra note 1, at 110.
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substances "to include almost every conceivable performance-enhancing
drug. 25 But the science of drug creation will always move faster than the
science of drug testing. A drug not "conceived" as performance enhancing
might very well prove to be, but it will likely remain absent from the list of
banned substances until years after its use permeates professional athletics.
Anti-doping authorities tend to feel like "they are always a little bit
behind. 26  By the time a test is developed, a new version of the
performance-enhancing drug may have been developed that would defeat
the test.27
Even where a substance is identified among a list of banned
substances, existing technology may not allow accurate detection via non-
invasive testing means.28 Some types of doping, most notably autologous
blood doping (in which an athlete receives a transfusion of the athlete's
own blood, drawn at an earlier time) are virtually undetectable.29
Another striking example is the use of Human Growth Hormone
(HGH). Even as sports leagues started to "get tough" on steroids, athletes
turned to the use of HGH, which replicated some of the positive effects of
steroids but proved nearly undetectable. 30 This substance naturally occurs
in the body, and the only means of detection is through a blood test.
31
However, the test only discovers unusually high levels of the hormone in
the body,32 and can thus fail to detect use by many athletes.
In addition, athletes have proven adept at manipulating their substance
use to avoid testing positive on an announced testing date, either by the
timing of substance use or by employing masking agents which frustrate
existing testing regimes.33 For example, an athlete can use a banned
substance, but then taper use before testing and avoid a positive result.34
The sad fact of life in professional sports is that the testing regimes will
25 E. Tim Walker, Comment, Missing the Target: How Performance-Enhancing Drugs
Go Unnoticed and Endanger the Lives of Athletes, 10 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 181, 208
(2003).
26 Hector Del Cid, Winning at All Costs: Can Major League Baseball's New Drug Policy
Deter Kids from Steroids and Maintain the Integrity of the Game?, 14 SPORTS LAW. J. 169,
191 (2007).
27 Id. at 192.
28 See Thurston, supra note 1, at 147.
29 Michele Verroken & David R. Mottram, Doping Control in Sport, in DRUGS IN SPORT
309, 339 (David R. Mottram ed., 4th ed. 2005).
30 Del Cid, supra note 26, at 182.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Thurston, supra note 1, at 109-10.
34 Del Cid, supra note 26, at 191.
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never catch up to the cheaters. 35 The financial stakes involved for players
create powerful incentives for the use of ever more evasive performance-
enhancing substances. So long as it remains a "certainty that a large
number of cheating athletes will beat the tests,, 36 no testing-and-
punishment regime will eradicate performance-enhancing substance use.
A further drawback of a specified list of banned substances is that
37inclusion of a substance on such a list can, ironically, encourage its use.
For instance, even though the scientific evidence on whether HGH is
actually a performance enhancer is mixed, inclusion of HGH on doping lists
may inadvertently promote its use among athletes.38
A generically described "illicit substance" ban, rather than a ban based
on a specific substance list, also fails to solve the problem. Here, the main
impediment is the zealous representation provided to professional athletes
by their players' unions and associations.39 Because any testing regime is
necessarily a "required" subject of collective bargaining (particularly where
failed tests lead to disciplinary sanction), ° such a scheme requires union
acquiescence. Given unions' rightful concern with protecting their
members from discipline in the absence of notice, they are likely to oppose
any broad prohibition or extensive testing regime.41
B. PLAYER HEALTH
A second argument in support of aggressive anti-substance regimes
posits that the use of steroids and other performance-enhancing substances
and drugs has negative health effects on users.42 Anabolic steroids, in
35 "The relatively small number of athletes who are 'caught' suggest that either drug
abuse is not a rampant problem or, if it is rampant, that most of the 'cheaters' escape
detection." Melethil, supra note 22, at 89.
36 Sarah Baldwin, Comment, Performance Enhancing Drug Use in Olympic Sport: A
Comparison of the United States and Australian Approaches, 24 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 265, 271 (2002) (quoting Glenn Zorpette, The Chemical Games, Sci. AM., Fall 2000, at
16-17).
37 Melethil, supra note 22, at 87.
38 Id. ("The mere listing of a substance or method in such a list is misinterpreted by most
athletes that the substance or method offers an advantage.").
39 Neil Hayes, Union's Stance on Steroids Is Puzzling, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Mar. 11,
2004, at B 1.
40 Thurston, supra note 1, at 122.
41 Jarred R. Tynes, Comment, Performance Enhancing Substances: Effects, Regulations,
and the Pervasive Efforts to Control Doping in Major League Baseball, 27 J. LEGAL MED.
493,504 (2006).
42 See Thurston, supra note 1, at 94.
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particular, are said to negatively affect players' health.43 According to the
famous Mitchell Report:
Steroid users place themselves at risk for psychiatric problems, cardiovascular and
liver damage, drastic changes to their reproductive systems, musculoskeletal injury,
and other problems. Users of human growth hormone risk cancer, harm to their
reproductive health, cardiac and thyroid problems, and overgrowth of bone and
connective tissue.44
Woven into this argument about player health is the suggestion that
steroids and other performance-enhancing drugs result in an "arms race" by
athletes. That is to say, athletes who prefer to stay "clean" are compelled to
use steroids out of a fear that other athletes use them.45 In other words,
athletes who would otherwise stay clean are coerced into substance use.46
This argument, as Professor Lewis Kurlantzick argues, is similar to the
"problem of coordination" faced by a group of fishermen who work in the
same fishing grounds.4 7 Individually, each fisherman might prefer to take a
smaller catch today to preserve the fish population for future fishing.48 Yet
fearful that others will not exercise the same restraint, each is tempted to
over-fish, and the result is a quick destruction of the fish population.49
Steroid use, if athletes' stated reluctance is believed, results, at least in part,
from a similar lack of coordination, resulting in a "tragedy of the
commons." 50 This is an extension of the classic and familiar "prisoner's
dilemma." 
51
But there is no reason why the players' collective representation-the
players' association-cannot accomplish the necessary coordination. 52  If
collective action is really the problem, unions are well equipped to advocate
on players' behalves, particularly given the unions' longstanding concern
for the health of their members. That so little of the impetus for drug
testing regime reform comes at the request of players' unions seems to run
counter to the characterization of performance-enhancing drug use as the
product of a prisoner's dilemma.
41 See id.
44 MITCHELL, supra note 5, at SR-8.
45 Thurston, supra note 1, at 102-03.
46 Latiner, supra note 20, at 209.
47 Kurlantzick, supra note 21, at 792.
48 Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable Patent Rights, 60 STAN. L. REV. 863,
881-82 (2007) (describing the fishing example as a textbook tragedy of the commons).
49 See Will Walsh, Comment, Fishy Business, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1661,1663 (2008).
50 Id.
51 See Richard H. McAdams & Janice Nadler, Coordinating in the Shadow of the Law:
Two Contextualized Tests of the Focal Point Theory of Legal Compliance, 42 LAW & Soc'Y
REV. 865, 871 (2008).
52 Kurlantzick, supra note 21, at 792.
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Assertions of negative health effects associated with steroid use are
undercut, to some degree, by the lack of accurate and rigorous scientific
data concerning the kind of doses used by athletes. 3 Still, even in the
absence of "controlled" studies, it seems clear that many athletes use
substances at levels that do raise genuine health concerns.54 Anabolic
steroids' negative side effects include increased risks of cancer and
suppressed immune systems. 55 Further, long-term use of such substances
can have deleterious effects both physiologically and psychologically.
56
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the common concept of "roid rage,"
heightened aggressiveness flowing from steroid use, has scientific
validity. 57  Other substances, such as weight-loss supplements, are
documented as causes of death for athletes at both the professional and
amateur levels.
58
Ultimately, however, expressions of concern for players' health are
unpersuasive because of how little regard we pay to other unhealthy choices
and lifestyles of professional athletes. Football itself is an unhealthy
activity; certainly, the position of offensive lineman would be banned if
leagues truly valued players' long-term health. Tobacco use among
baseball players is tolerated.59 Players are also permitted to engage in risky
patterns of sexual promiscuity, 60 if not lionized for that dangerous course of
conduct.6' Why we express concern about the plausible health risks from
steroids, but not the obvious health risks of these other behaviors, is
indecipherable, or at least indefensible.
53 Thurston, supra note 1, at 103-04.
54 See Glenn D. Braunstein, Anabolic Steroid Use to Enhance Athletes' Performance, 65
S. CAL. L. REV. 373,379 (1991).
55 Thurston, supra note 1, at 105-06.
56 Latiner, supra note 20, at 193.
57 Thurston, supra note 1, at 106.
58 See Shapiro, supra note 2, at 199; Tynes, supra note 41, at 494.
59 See Julian Guthrie, Baseball Players Chew Tension Away: Tobacco, Gum, Seeds Part
of the Game, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 22, 2002, at B1O, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f-/chronicle/archive/2002/10/22/SP32948.DTL (noting that Major League
Baseball has yet to adopt a minor league ban on tobacco announced in 1993).
60 E.M. Swift, Dangerous Games: In the Age of AIDS, Many Pro Athletes Are Sexually
Promiscuous, Despite the Increasing Peril, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 18, 1991,
http://vault.sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG 1 140269/index.htm.
61 Wilt Chamberlain's autobiographical claim to have slept with 20,000 women was not
condemned, but rather has become part of the athlete's legend. For instance, a satirist
described the NBA's decision to honor this infamous "record." See Sportsman's Daily,
Chamberlain's 20,000-Women Mark Finally to Be Honored by NBA, CBSSPORTS.COM, Sept.




A third argument made in support of aggressive anti-performance-
enhancing substance regimes stems from the direct threat to younger
athletes and fans.62 Professional athletes are considered "role models" for
younger athletes, and, arguably, the use of performance-enhancing
substances by professional athletes makes the use of such substances
socially acceptable for younger potential users.6 3
Whether such substances enhance an athlete's on-the-field or on-the-
court performance, the use of such substances "conveys a message to
younger players ... that cheating to win is acceptable as long as the player
is not caught.",64  Teenagers use performance-enhancing substances to
emulate professional athletes.65
There are two counters to this argument. First, at a basic level, if a
professional athlete is a child's role model for moral and ethical choices, his
parent faces a serious problem. As Charles Barkley put it, "'the biggest role
models are parents, not famous jocks and famous people."'' 66 Athletes make
all sorts of choices that most parents would abhor their children using as life
lessons. Athletes often carry guns (sometimes illegally),67 are sexually
promiscuous, 6s and are domestic abusers. 69 Nevertheless, athletes' morally
questionable conduct, with gambling as a notable exception, is rarely a
lightning rod for public criticism in the same way that performance-
enhancing drug use is.
More problematic for a testing policy, however, is the ironic result of
overly enthusiastic testing. The more we test athletes, the more we will,
inevitably, discover about their drug use. More positive tests mean more
"fallen heroes." The goal of preserving athletes' moral status for role
model purposes actually seems best served by a regime with no testing. So
long as athletes do not brag about their own activities--or point the finger
62 MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 15.
63 Thurston, supra note 1, at 103.
64 Walker, supra note 25, at 201.
65 Joseph M. Saka, Comment, Back to the Game: How Congress Can Help Sports
Leagues Shift the Focus from Steroids to Sports, 23 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 341,
359 (2007).
66 JAMES MCCLOSKEY & JULIAN BAILES, WHEN WINNING COSTS Too MUCH: STEROIDS,
SUPPLEMENTS, AND SCANDAL IN TODAY'S SPORTS 31 (2005).
67 Arty Berko et al., Athletes & Guns: "Outside the Lines" Takes a Look at the Link
Between Athletes and Guns, ESPN.COM, Dec. 15, 2006, http://sports.espn.go.com/
espn/columns/story?id=2691043.
68 See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
69 Carrie A. Moser, Penalties, Fouls and Errors: Professional Athletes and Violence
Against Women, 11 SPORTS LAW. J. 69, 70 (2004).
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at other heroes-our children are free to idolize superstar athletes without
negative effect.
D. MANIPULATION BY GAMBLERS
A fourth argument in favor of an aggressive anti-performance-
enhancing substance regime begins with the recognition that, even when a
substance is available through legal channels, many users acquire their
performance-enhancing substances illegally. 70  The black market for
steroids tops $100 million in transactions per year.71 Sports leagues express
concern that black market sellers of performance-enhancing substances can
use the leverage provided by their knowledge of a player's use to blackmail
him into throwing games or shaving points.72
Baseball in particular has long feared manipulation by gamblers, and
the possible leverage a drug dealer possesses over a player is cited as
grounds for imposing harsh sanctions for drug use by athletes.73 According
to the Mitchell Report, "[t]he Commissioner's Office has been concerned
for decades that drug dealers could blackmail a player to alter the outcome
of a game in exchange for maintaining the secrecy of the player's substance
use."
74
The problem with justifying an anti-steroids regime with a fear of
gambling, however, is twofold. First, the leagues all have separate rules to
deter association with gamblers and the manipulation of on-field
performance.75 In any instance where drug use gives a gambler leverage
over a player, the existing rules are more than adequate to impose a
sanction.
76
More troubling is the escalation of blackmail that may result.
Ironically, as the leagues impose harsher sanctions for drug use, they give
more power to gamblers. A gambler seeking to manipulate a player is more
likely to get what she wants if the penalties for revelation of the player's
drug use are significant.
If we are concerned about manipulation, moreover, we should test
owners, coaches, and referees. These individuals are equally positioned, if
70 Thurston, supra note 1, at 107-08.
71 Id.
72 MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 301.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 See Matthew B. Pachman, Note, Limits on the Discretionary Powers of Professional
Sports Commissioners: A Historical and Legal Analysis of Issues Raised by the Pete Rose
Controversy, 76 VA. L. REv. 1409, 1429 (1990).
76 That said, a drug-testing regime might uncover potentially vulnerable players left
undiscovered under the association rule.
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not better positioned, to manipulate the outcome of a sporting event. They
could be vulnerable to manipulation by their drug dealers. But so far, little
attention is directed toward a testing regime for such individuals.
E. FANS DON'T LIKE TAINTED SPORTS
A final argument in favor of aggressive treatment of performance-
enhancing drugs is that the fans, on whose patronage professional sports
depend, lose interest in professional sports when the integrity of
competition is doubted.77  This argument draws on the idea that
performance-enhancing drugs produce an uneven playing field and suggests
that leagues become "less appealing to spectators" if players use
performance-enhancing substances to "become bigger, stronger, or faster
than they otherwise would be.",78 Fans want to see "natural talent and
ability" on display, and the use of performance-enhancing drugs undercuts
that spectacle.79
The assertion that fans reject or would shy away from a league
corrupted by steroids is a testable empirical proposition that remains
untested. Maybe fans want to see "natural" talent on display; on the other
hand, they certainly do not want to see five random guys off the street take
the hard court against five other guys. Fans cheer for professional athletes
who are, in many respects, genetic deviants-faster, stronger, and more
talented than the average human. In an episode of The Simpsons, fans
bemoan the potential loss of one of the town's NBA players, "Nook of the
North," who they refer to as "Our Freak., 80 Although this terminology is a
bit harsh, it is clear that fans do not want to see normal people play.
Professional athletes are heralded precisely for their abnormal genetic gifts
and their abnormal commitment to physical fitness and training.
Perhaps the most striking real world evidence to contradict the fan
preference justification for testing arises from the 1998 baseball season, in
which both Sammy Sosa and Mark McGwire broke Roger Maris's four-
decade-old single season home run record. 81  Although the subsequent
histories written of Sosa and McGwire suggest their home run chases were
"tainted" by substance use,82 fans were certainly cheering at the time.83 Is it
77 Wachutka, supra note 10, at 149-50.
78 Id. at 149.
79 Id. at 150.
80 The Simpsons: The Burns and the Bees (FOX television broadcast Dec. 7, 2008).
81 See Daniel Healey, Fall of the Rocket: Steroids in Baseball and the Case Against
Roger Clemens, 19 MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 289, 300 (2008).
82 Wachutka, supra note 10, at 150.
83 Healey, supra note 81, at 300. The "adulation" that fans gave to Sosa and McGwire
allegedly inspired Barry Bonds to take up performance-enhancing substance use himself. Id.
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safe to assume that fans were blissfully unaware of the possibility these two
dramatically enhanced physical specimens were using something other than
hard work to achieve their success? To make such an assumption gives
fans too little credit. Fans must have noticed that, "at a time when most
players' skills begin to decline,, 84 McGwire and Sosa suddenly reached
new levels of power. Fans suspected, but they cheered anyway. Similarly,
fans have shown a remarkably short memory when it comes to their distaste
for even admitted substance users.85
If the integrity of baseball were called into question, one journalist
argued, baseball would come to resemble professional wrestling.86
Professional wrestling is known to be "fake, 87 and its athlete-actors quite
obviously partake in a regular diet of performance-enhancing substances.
88Yet professional wrestling is amazingly popular in this country, even if
derided by members of the sports media.
What is to say that fans would not cheer with equal vigor for a
surgically, robotically, genetically, or chemically enhanced athlete? In any
event, if fan preference is to be the basis for an anti-steroid regime, that
regime would perhaps be better designed if it allowed fan preference to play
an incentivizing role. The "Blue Sky" model developed in this Essay would
do precisely that.
III. THE BLUE SKY MODEL
It has been said that if clean competition is the desired end point, "the
only solution would be a complete ban of any performance enhancer."
89
Others have argued that the only way to ensure policy effectiveness would
84 Michael J. Cramer & James M. Swiatko, Jr., Did Major League Baseball Balk? Why
Didn't MLB Bargain to Impasse and Impose Stricter Testing for Performance Enhancing
Substances?, 17 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 29, 36 (2006). Most visibly, during the 1998 home run
chase McGwire was found to have the substance andostenedione in his locker. Id. at 42.
Although this substance was legal in baseball at the time, it was banned by most other
leagues and international anti-doping authorities. Id.
85 The same fans who "pilloried" Jason Giambi in the spring of 2005 voted him
"'Comeback Player of the Year,' although he might only have been coming back from self-
inflicted problems related to his use of illegal drugs." MARK FAINARU-WADA & LANCE
WILLIAMS, GAME OF SHADOwS: BARRY BONDS, BALCO, AND THE STEROIDS SCANDAL THAT
ROCKED PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 267 (2006).
86 Id. at 55.
87 A.0. Scott, A Wrestler's Hard Knocks, Both Given and Gotten, Start Taking Their
Toll, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2008, at C7.
88 Professional wrestling is the most popular television genre for the eighteen- to thirty-
five-year-old male demographic. Lawrence Daressa, Wrestling with Manhood, CINEASTE,
Spring 2004, at 96, available at 2004 WLNR 12683565.
89 Del Cid, supra note 26, at 194.
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be to increase greatly sanctions associated with a positive test result. 90 But
is there another approach?
The federal securities laws were passed in the midst of the Great
Depression and inspired by the stock market crash of "Black Tuesday,"
October 29, 1929.91 Investors had pulled their money en masse from the
publicly traded stock exchanges, resulting in the destruction of over $14
billion dollars in market capitalization.92 Fraudulent stock promotions
played a contributing role in the market crash. 93 The crash caused investors
to lose faith in the market price of stocks as an accurate indicator of value
and in the underlying business institutions as investments for their assets.
94
Federal securities regulation aimed to restore that faith.95
Congress could have chosen to regulate business activity in a
substantive manner in order to restore this lost investor confidence.
Congress could have called on businesses to avoid risky investments, or to
diversify their holdings across industries to avoid potential downturns.
96
But these approaches would deny corporations needed flexibility and
require the government to launch a massive and expensive regulatory
regime to identify and penalize offenders of whatever substantive
behavioral standards Congress had put in place.
Instead, Congress enacted legislation to supplement various states'
"Blue Sky" laws.97  Blue Sky laws were investor protection statutes,
designed to protect shareholders from fraud and deception, 98 and required
corporations seeking to raise capital through the sale of securities to register
90 Tynes, supra note 41, at 507-08.
91 See JAMES D. Cox & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS 292 (2d ed. 2003).
92 Sargon Daniel, Note, Hedge Fund Registration: Yesterday's Regulatory Schemes for
Today's Investment Vehicles, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 247,276.
93 Cox & HAZEN, supra note 91.
94 Brent J. Horton, How Corporate Lawyers Escaped Sarbanes-Oxley: Disparate
Treatment in the Legislative Process, 60 S.C. L. REV. 149, 183 n.198 (2008) (citing James
Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 30
(1959)).
95 Id.
96 Prior to the passage of the post-Enron Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the federal approach to
regulation of the financial market emphasized disclosure rather than substantive corporate
governance mandates. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1523 (2005).
97 See Stefania A. Di Trolio, Public Choice Theory, Federalism, and the Sunny Side to
Blue-Sky Laws, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1279, 1289-92 (2004) (discussing the history
behind federal securities legislation).
98 Charles G. Stinner, Note, Estoppel and In Pari Delicto Defenses to Civil Blue Sky Law
Actions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 448,462 (1988).
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with a state securities commissioner.99 In passing the federal securities
statutes, Congress sought to achieve a similar result. The federal approach
imposed further requirements on affected corporations to disclose their
financial information and business practices to shareholders, and imposed
punishments, not for substantive business transactions, but for material
fraud and failure to disclose. As Dean Clark explains, the federal securities
acts are "based on a philosophy of full disclosure rather than on an ideal of
substantive regulation."' 00
The core concept of the federal regulation of securities consists of
"antifraud rules and a mandatory disclosure system."' 0 ' Before securities
can be sold to the public, the Securities Act of 1933 requires the corporation
to file a disclosure document with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and circulate a portion of that document, a prospectus, to
investors. 10 2 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires publicly-held
companies-those that have sold shares that trade on public exchanges-to
file regular reports with the SEC.' 03
The SEC's Rule lOb-5,10 4 promulgated under authority provided by the
1934 Securities Exchange Act, is a "catchall antifraud provision."'0 5 Rule
1 Ob-5 helps "regulate the flow of information to the investing public and in
many instances to compel corporate disclosure of material facts."'0 6 The
end-goal of this system may be to make pricing of securities more
accurate. 0 7 Accurate pricing, in turn, ensures that capital will be directed to
the corporate actors most likely to use financial resources provided by
shareholders for productive economic activity.'0 8  Alternatively, the
mandatory disclosure regime has been defended as reducing the agency
costs associated with the separation of ownership and control in corporate
enterprises.109
99 These laws were viewed as inadequate to regulate securities markets. Cox & HAZEN,
supra note 91, at 292 n.3.
100 ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 719 (1986).
1o1 WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL
AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 428 (10th ed. 2007).
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2008).
105 Cox & HAZEN, supra note 91, at 293.
106 Id. at 293-94.
107 Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of "Inaccurate " Stock Prices, 41
DUKE LJ. 977,985 (1992).
'O Id. at 1007.
109 See generally Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency
Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1049-50 (1995) (noting that shareholders own
corporations, but delegate control to corporate leaders, and explaining that to monitor their
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The federal securities laws aim to ensure that investors have adequate
information to make rational decisions in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities.l° As the Supreme Court explains:
Disclosure, and not paternalistic withholding of accurate information, is the policy
chosen and expressed by Congress. We have recognized time and again, a
"fundamental purpose" of the various Securities Acts, "was to substitute a philosophy
of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high
standard of business ethics in the securities industry."
11I
Without federally mandated disclosure, market forces were seen as
inadequate to regulate risk-taking by corporate actors.'" 2 "Self-help"
remedies are less feasible in connection with the purchase and sale of
securities than in ordinary contract settings."l 3 Investors need information
about corporate activities to be presented in a reliable and standardized
fashion to "facilitate comparisons among securities."'1 14 Absent federally
mandated disclosure, investors might be reluctant to commit funds to
corporate activity,"1 5 and would certainly be more skittish in the event of
market downturns. 16 For securities markets to function properly, "much




Although there is much scholarly debate on the effectiveness of the
federal mandatory disclosure policy, 18 it seems clear that Congress
believed that prior to the enactment of the Securities Act and Securities
Exchange Act, corporate actors did not disclose sufficient information
about their business activities. 9
IV. HOW THE BLUE SKY MODEL WOULD SOLVE OUR STEROIDS
"PROBLEM"
I do not argue that steroids and other performance-enhancing
substances are good. To do so, as others have worried, might spark calls for
agents, shareholders must have access to information, and thus mandatory disclosure reduces
monitoring costs for shareholders).
o10 CLARK, SUpra note 100, at 719.
111 Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 234 (1988).
112 Kun Young Chang, Reforming US. Disclosure Rules in Global Securities Markets,
22 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 237, 245 (2003).
113 See RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 3 (8th ed. 1998).
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 See Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure
System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1, 52-53 (1983).
117 JENNINGS ETAL., supra note 113, at 3.




an author's "crucifi[xion]." 2°  The question isn't whether reducing
performance-enhancing substance use among professional athletes is a
laudable aspiration. The question is, given our society's expressed desire to
regulate performance-enhancing drug use, how should that goal best be
achieved from a policy perspective, pragmatically and promptly? The
answer is through faith in the market, assisted by an aggressive regime
designed to promote disclosure and punish fraud and omission.
Rather than impose obtrusive and unwieldy testing regimes, a
disclosure-based framework should be implemented. Under this system,
professional athletes would be required to file disclosure statements with
the league office on a regular basis-perhaps three times a season, perhaps
more regularly. In that statement, an athlete would disclose all non-food
substances12 1 injected or ingested by the athlete. The league could then
conduct a "privacy scrub," deleting references to medicines that implicate
privacy concerns (such as drugs to treat baldness, or a sexually transmitted
disease). The scrubbed lists would then be put online for the public to
view, either on the league's website or on the individual sites of the players'
teams.
A modest anti-fraud regime could be put in place to provide sanctions
not for those who use performance enhancers, but for those who fail to
disclose with complete candor the substances that they use. Once the
information hits the "market," market forces could quickly curb the
problem of steroid use. If fans detest steroid use, "it would make sense[,]
simply as a matter of sound commercial judgment ... to avoid ... customer
alienation[,]J"1 22 for teams to decline to hire players with disclosed
performance-enhancing substance records. Some teams could announce
their preference to sign only "clean" players. If fans responded, by buying
more tickets and memorabilia and watching more televised games, such
teams would find their anti-substance stance profitable even if their on-the-
field success took a short-term hit.
The market approach would also be more subtle than a heavy-handed
testing regime. Some substances, like anabolic steroids or HGH, might be
detested by fans; others, like pain killers, might be tolerated. And for
players with known lingering injuries, the use of even HGH might be
tolerated by fans; a universal testing and punishment approach is not
capable of making such allowances.
120 Joseph Siprut, The Uproar Concerning Steroids in Baseball: A Slippery Slope with
No Clear Answers, ENT. & SPORTS LAW, Winter 2006, at 13, 13.
121 While a creative athlete might try to pitch a performance enhancer as "food," I trust
that existing FDA and state law definitions of that term would avoid potential manipulation.
122 Kurlantzick, supra note 21, at 794.
2009]
GEOFFREY RAPP
The market approach would also be fair and consistent in a way that
testing is not, by doing away with the "innocent dopee" defense. A number
of athletes who tested positive for steroids denied that they had knowingly
used performance enhancers. 123  A heavy-handed disciplinary approach
would reject any such defense, while a lighter approach that allowed such a
defense would invite athletes to maintain willful ignorance about what they
put, or allowed trainers to put, into their bodies. By contrast, a disclosure
regime would be clean. If an athlete failed to disclose an ingested or
injected substance, the athlete's failure would be clear. If an athlete
disclosed a substance that he or she did not know contained a performance
enhancer, the market would operate to bring that information to the athlete's
attention.
A disclosure system would stay current and ahead of the cheaters,
since it does not depend on an ossified list of banned substances or an
unenforceably broad category of enhancers. Of course, in order to be
effective, punishment would need to be imposed on those who used a
substance without disclosure. Punishment could only result where
information came to light about a player's use of a substance that
contradicted his disclosures. Without a testing scheme, some players would
use, lie, and remain undetected. The regulation of securities fraud,
however, confronts the same issue. No aggressive auditing of financial
statements is conducted by the SEC for every corporate submission;
instead, the agency depends upon tips, often from Self-Regulatory
Organizations (SROs) like the New York Stock Exchange and the National
Association of Securities Dealers. In the same way, the steroids disclosure
regime could launch investigations after receiving tips from the sports
media, teams, and other individuals and entities affiliated with professional
sports. Moreover, just as the SEC may launch investigations after sudden
dramatic changes in corporate stock price, a steroids disclosure regime
could launch proactive investigations when players' performances deviate
dramatically from past trends.
Information disclosed pursuant to the regime suggested in this Essay
would allow each player to make an accurate assessment of what substances
other athletes are using and would serve to reduce the trend towards an
"arms race." At present, players might use performance-enhancing drugs
because they suspect others are doing so. Under the disclosure approach,
players would have the information they need to make decisions about how
to handle their own substance regimen.
123 Lindsay J. Taylor, Note, Congressional Attempts to "Strike Out" Steroids:
Constitutional Concerns About the Clean Sports Act, 49 ARIz. L. REv. 961,980 (2007).
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To be sure, at least in the short term, a "disclosure" based
performance-enhancing substance regime might lead to more substance use.
This could present health concerns for particular athletes who choose to use
such substances. Ultimately, of course, "the choice to risk harm associated
with drug enhancements is ultimately up to the individual user .... 124
Adults are "in a position to make a decision about what behavior is in their
best interest, to weigh the risks and benefits according to their own
values."
125
Professional athletes are uniquely positioned to make these decisions
for themselves, with a stable of trainers and team doctors to advise them.
The increased public recognition of particular athletes' choices could also
lead to an increased level of public warning for such athletes. Indeed, a
disclosure-based regime could stimulate more research on such substances
and actually provide professionals with more information about the long-
term consequences of such use.
A disclosure system would also bring to light information that might
lead parents to suggest their children find other role models. In the short
term, we might be shocked at the percentage of professional athletes who
use performance-enhancing substances. But a disclosure system would also
avoid the surprise disappointment a young fan faces at learning that her
lifelong idol has done drugs. We would know from a player's first day in
the Big Leagues whether he would be the kind of person a youngster should
idolize.
A disclosure system would eliminate the potential for drug dealers to
use their leverage to manipulate players to achieve ill-gotten gambling
gains. Since all substances used would become public information, dealers
would have no leverage over their player clients.
Finally, a disclosure system would provide the ultimate test of the
assertion that fans prefer a clean league to a dirty league. Market forces
would drive owners to contract with the players that fans prefer-whether
they are drug users with great ability, or clean players with less zip on their
swings. Just as the securities laws restored faith in markets (at least until
recently), a disclosure-based regime for steroids could restore fan faith in
professional sports.
In some sense, the argument in favor of regulation-through-disclosure
is justified if the steroid problem in professional sports is characterized as a
market failure. The arguments against steroid use-particularly those that
focus on fan preferences-are strengthened by the view that a market
approach could solve the problem if only markets functioned properly.
124 Latiner, supra note 20, at 209.
125 Kurlantzick, supra note 21, at 791.
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Teams would respond to fan preferences, and steroid users would be
systematically excluded from professional sports through the forces of
supply and demand. At present, those forces cannot solve the problem
because performance-enhancing substance use is clouded in mystery and
obfuscation. 126  Through disclosure, powerful market forces would be
unleashed and produce an "optimal" level of substance use.
V. CONCLUSION
Whether or not the use of performance-enhancing substances is the
best use of policymakers' time, it has clearly attracted their attention. Most
public discussion of the issue has been long on condemnation and short on
nuanced evaluation of policy options. To date, doping authorities have
called for ever-more-intrusive testing and ever-harsher sanctions, ignoring
the painful reality that such efforts will never catch determined cheaters. It
is hard to call the solution proposed in this Essay "radical," given that it was
one that Congress considered eight decades ago. Yet it offers an approach
to addressing drug use in sports that could actually make a difference.
126 See Melethil, supra note 22, at 80.
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